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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

Burma Communist Party (BCP)

Next Review Date: 2008

1. The central headquarters of the BCP (also known as the White Flags) has recently issued a new statement of policy, under the title "Towards Victory." The full text is not yet available, but a brief summary lately seen indicates that it contains few, if any, significant policy changes.
2. Other evidence of BCP activities make it clear that the party is seeking, through the medium of the People's Democratic Front (PDF), first, to gain control of the White Band People's Volunteer Organization (White Band PVO); and secondly, to secure support in circles which might be unwilling to join the party itself. Also, the Politburo has not neglected its search for other possible allies. In this connection, U Sein Da, for some years a leader of the Arakanese nationalist movement and an influential man in Arakan, is now reported to have thrown in with the BCP.
3. The BCP is making energetic efforts, although without any particular success, to recruit more members. As of July 1949 particular attention has been paid to the organization of youths. Instructions issued by the Lower Burma headquarters of the BCP have set recruiting targets (totaling 5,800) for various districts under its control; and as a guide to youth [redacted] has reproduced an article originally printed in the China New Daily. The article explains the organization of the China New Daily Corps and extolls its virtues and its value to the Chinese Communist Party.
4. Intensive efforts, by various methods, are being made to secure additional arms for the BCP. Several persons, described as gun runners for the Communists, have been arrested in Southern Burma for possessing arms and ammunition. A regular arms trade is known to take place between Government troops in the Chauk-Yenangyang area and the insurgents farther down the Irrawaddy. In addition, reports suggest that an arms factory on a small scale is being established in the Promé area, where it is

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known than an inland water transport engineer, working under duress, is repairing unserviceable arms for the insurgents.

6. Attention is being given by the BCP to military training, particularly among the peasants under party control. There has been talk of conscription. Meanwhile, BCP headquarters in Lower Burma recently ran a fifteen-day political training course for representatives from various districts. One of the main points emphasized in the lectures was that Democratic Fronts should be formed in all districts where they did not already exist and that the Communists concerned should make sure of securing key posts for themselves.
7. Twice during the month BCP propaganda, so frequently preoccupied with domestic issues, devoted itself to international affairs. A leaflet was issued which contained a diatribe against the Atlantic Pact, following the Russian line. Attention was also given to World Peace Day (see below).*
8. Plans have been devised to improve communications from BCP central headquarters to the various party branches by installing wireless links. Subordinate branches have been instructed to provide themselves with sets. A low-ranking Communist arrested by the police in mid-October had a transmitting and receiving set in his possession.

People's Democratic Front (PDF)

8. The BCP is still the prime force within the PDF, and is doing its best to ensure that any Democratic Fronts formed will be under BCP control. The plan of campaign envisaged in the original manifesto, according to which Democratic Fronts were to be formed at the various organizational levels (corresponding to the organization of the BCP) is now being demonstrated as the only possible maneuver by which the BCP can hope to gain any significant control over the White Band PVO's. The lack of central command and the irresponsibility of local leaders in the White Band PVO have been significant factors, in contrast with the smooth and disciplined working of the BCP organization, in preventing any effective cooperation between the two insurgent bodies. The BCP recognizes this and has adjusted its approach accordingly. Policy agreements reached at Central Headquarters must be negotiated afresh when a Democratic Front is formed at a lower level. Even so, the general unreliability of White Band PVO personalities makes it unlikely that the BCP will achieve any particular success.
9. The lack of agreement appears to be not so much over principles (for there is ample evidence that the PVO themselves favor the formation of Democratic Fronts) as over the question of control. PVO secret instructions issued in July warn against BCP "stab in the back" tactics and direct that undesirable BCP elements should be weeded out of the Democratic Front. A meeting of the All-Burma PVO (W) in October, which confirmed that negotiations are still in progress between the leaders, approved the

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11. Earlier reports that a Lower Burma Democratic Front had been formed appear to have been premature for there is documentary evidence that on 23 September it was still not in existence. Furthermore, a police report dated 19 October suggests that negotiations for the formation of such a body were still in progress between the BCP and White Band PVO officials. The report of those negotiations suggests that two essential points in a provisional agreement were a) a joint attack on the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) and b) land reform. It is of interest to see these two points cropping up for fresh discussion at a lower level when it is known that they had already been thrashed out at the top. An earlier meeting of the various party leaders, including Thakin Than Tun, had given consideration to a joint attack on the KNDO stronghold in Toungoo, while pamphlets issued from the Prome area, announcing a coalition between the People's Peasant Organization (probably PVO controlled) and the Communist All-Burma Peasants' Union, made a specific reference to land redistribution.

Communist Party (Burma)

12. One report received during the month suggests that the Communist Party (Burma) now has a Politburo of ten, headed by Thakin Soe, each leader being responsible for a particular area. The party's influence is negligible.

Burma Socialist Party (BSP)

13. U Ba Swe, General Secretary and strong man of the BSP, emerged from his normal seclusion in early October to open a discussion circle under the aegis of the People's Literature Committee (of which he is president). In carefully moderate terms, he pointed out the value of general discussion of political questions in the search for a solution to Burma's problems. He suggested, rather pointedly, that any political solution must take into account the fact that over 90% of Burma's population were either peasants or workers whose special interests must be protected, and could not omit a reference to the "colonial shackles" which were still strangling Burma's economy.
14. The Rangoon branch of the TASS agency, established by the Socialist-controlled People's Literature House, issued its first bulletin on 30 October, on the subject of MAO Tse-tung's "Organic Law". As this bulletin was identical with a Reuter report of the same date, it still has to be established whether this was a direct service from India, which is expected to be the source of TASS material, or merely local "piracy" to give substance to a project which had been announced some week earlier.
15. The main activities of the BSP during the month appear to have centered around its labor organization, the Trades Union Congress (Burma) (TUC(B)) which has been making determined efforts to secure more effective control of labor. In Rangoon, the adoption of Socialists as the representatives of several smaller unions has been secured. In the oilfields, through its United Front for Action (UFA), the TUC(B) has claimed to be the sole representatives of the workers and has tried to secure recognition of this claim in the negotiations which have been in progress between the Burma Oil Company and its oilfield labor.
16. Early in the month, the TUC(B) was vigorous in advocating affiliation to the WFTU, having engineered resolutions in support of the proposal from several subordinate unions, and had effected an unmistakably Communist attitude towards capital in Burma. This caused the Government and other interested parties to bring strong pressure to bear on the TUC(B) to moderate its tone. Accordingly on 23 October, U Khin Zaw, Secretary of the

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TUC(B) issued a statement in which he disclaimed any particular leanings on the part of the TUC(B) towards the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). He explained that the TUC(B) wished to adopt the best features of both the WFTU and the British Trades Union organization; no delegates were to be sent to the forthcoming WFTU conference in Peiping or to the International Trades Union Organization (ITUO) conference in London, but at some future date the TUC(B) planned to send members to the headquarters of both groups for consultation.**

17. The campaign for affiliation to the WFTU had other repercussions in the disquiet that was felt at this extremist policy by more moderate members of the BSP, and an informed source has stated that there were signs of a "line up" within the Party for and against the proposal. Ba Swe, Thakin Tin and the Socialist All-Burma Peasants' Association were opposed to it. Although a difference of opinion had arisen over the issue, however, it was not sufficiently serious to give rise to a split in the Party at present.

World Peace Day

18. The Council of Workers Emergency Struggle TUC(B) decided at a meeting on 22 September to celebrate "World Peace Day" on 2 October. After the meeting the TUC(B) issued a directive to all labor unions and organizations under its control, ordering them to attend the celebration. Forty-four representatives from twenty-two labor organizations complied with the order. Advance publicity for the meeting was given in a TUC(B) pamphlet which, following the Russian line, dealt exclusively with the international aspects of the occasion.
19. The Rangoon District BCP also took note of World Peace Day, but the only activity on the part of the BCP was an exhibition of posters contrasting the aims of World Peace Day with Thakin Nu's plan for "Peace within one year" which was condemned as a move designed for "mass massacre".

World Peace Congress

20. At a meeting of the Rangoon District Organization Committee of the BCP in late September, it was decided that representatives should meet with Thakin Lwin and representatives of the students' organizations, bazaar organizations and Federated Services Union on 1 October. These discussions would cover the formation of a World Peace Congress (Burma Branch) under joint leadership.***

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- * [REDACTED] Comment. Press reports indicate that on 25 October a mass demonstration was held at Brome. Banners of the BCP, the People's Democratic Army and the Chinese Communist Government were displayed. The demonstration, presided over by Bo Chit Maung, PDF leader, was a eulogy of the achievements of the Chinese Communists.

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- ** [REDACTED] Comment. Under the circumstances, this statement can be disregarded as one of policy. Even if open affiliation is not made, the TUC(B) will do its best to forge discreet links with the WFTU.

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- *** [REDACTED] Comment. This is the first indication of any liaison between the BCP and the BSP, but in view of the amount of evidence of bitter animosity existing between the two, it cannot be accepted [REDACTED].

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